

SECOND SUMMER SCHOOL IN COMPETITION POLICY AND MARKET REGULATION

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Thursday 11/09/07 (morning)

1. Horizontal mergers

- Unilateral effects

Unilateral effects absent efficiency gains

Variables which affect unilateral effects

Efficiency gains

- Pro-collusive effects

Variables which affect pro-collusive effects

- The EU merger policy

The EU Merger Regulation

The New Merger Regulation

Thursday 11/09/07 (afternoon)

2. The economics of article 82

- Predatory pricing

In search for a theory of predation

Reputation models

Signal jamming

Financial predation

- Non-price exclusionary strategies: tying

Tying as a commitment device

Tying with complementary products

Tying as a price discrimination device

Efficiency reasons for tying

Friday 12/09/07 (morning)

- Non-price exclusionary strategies: exclusive dealing

The traditional argument

The Chicago School critique

Anti-competitive exclusive dealing

Efficiency reasons for exclusive dealing

- Price discrimination
- The review of art. 82

Readings

1. Motta M., *Competition Policy. Theory and Practice*, Cambridge University Press, 2004. Chapter 5, Chapter 6 (par. 6.4.1), Chapter 7.
2. Whinston M., *Lectures on Antitrust Economics*, MIT Press, 2006 Chapter 3, Chapter 4.
3. *An economic approach to Article 82*, Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy, July 2005.
4. DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 83 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses.
5. *The Economics of Unilateral Effects*, IDEI Working Paper, n. 222, Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003 (by Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Paul Seabright, Patrick Rey, and Jean Tirole).